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Inside the Restatement*
Aaron D. Twerski**
I. INTRODUCTION
The American Law Institute Council recently approved the Proposed
Final Draft (Preliminary Version 1996) of the Restatement (Third) of
Torts: Products Liability and recommended its adoption at the
Institute's annual meeting in May 1997.' As Reporters, James A.
Henderson, Jr. and V' were responsible for drafting the black-letter law
and comments, both of which have been the subject of considerable
debate and controversy.
The purpose of this Article is to provide insight into the develop-
ments that have shaped our views in the drafting of the Restatement. I
begin in Part II with an overview of the drafting process.' Part Ill con-
tinues with a discussion of the interplay between the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur and the requirement of a reasonable alternative design.4
Part IV examines liability for a manifestly unreasonable design.' Several
difficult policy issues that are often litigated in crashworthiness cases
* Annotated Remarks of Professor Tweral's speech Inside the Restatement, giv-
en at the Association of American Law Schools Conference on Torts, Washington,
D.C., June 5.8, 1996. Professor Henderson has reviewed this Article and is in general
agreement, but the views expressed are those of the author alone.
** Newell DeValpine Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School; A.B., 1962, Beth
Medrash Elyon Research Institute; B.S., 1970, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee; J.D.,
1965, Marquette University.
1. The American Law Institute (ALl) Council approved the draft on December 12,
1996. The vote contemplates approval of suggested changes to the section dealing
with liability for the sale of used products by a committee to be appointed by the
President of the AU, Professor Charles Alan Wright, and the Director, Professor
Geoffrey A. Hazard, Jr.
2. Professors Henderson and Twerski are the co-Reporters of the RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY (Proposed Final Draft, Preliminary Version
1996).
3. See infra notes 9-16 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 17-26 and accompanying text
5. See iftfra notes 27-32 and accompanying text.
are covered in Part V.8 Prescription drug issues are examined in Part
VI, 7 and the relationship between the Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC) and the Restatement (Third) is discussed in Part VII.s
II. THE DRAFTING PROCESS
Before beginning the discussion of the more substantive issues of this
Article, I would like to provide an overview of the arduous process in-
volved in bringing a Restatement from a nascent concept to a draft that
receives approval from the Istitute's membership. The drafting process
is a dynamic one, involving three formal levels of intense discussion
and deliberation.
The drafting of a Restatement section begins with the preparation by
the Reporters of a preliminary draft of the black-letter law and the
comments. The Institute provides various groups with a copy of the
Preliminary Droft. These groups then meet with the Reporters to share
their reactions to this initial draft At the outset of a Restatement pro-
ject, the Institute appoints a group of formal advisors who remain in
close contact with the Reporters throughout the project.' These advi-
sors typically meet for a two-day conference where they thoroughly
discuss the Preliminary Draft. The Members Consultative Group"
holds a second meeting, comprised of ALI members who, because of
their interest in the project, have elected to become part of the formal
consultative process. The Reporters then hold a third meeting with bar
6. See iftr notes 33-44 and accompanying text.
7. See iqfrt notes 45-54 and accompanying text.
8. See iif notes 55-61 and accompanying text.
9. Attorneys, distinguished academics, and judges comprise the group of advisors.
The persons in this group are: Kenneth S. Abraham, University of Virginia School of
Law;, Sheila L Birnbaum, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom (New York); Roger
C. Cramton, Cornell Law School; Oscar S. Gray, University of Maryland School of
Law; Michael D. Green, University of Iowa College of Law; Robert L Habush,
Habush, Habush, Habush & Davis (Milwaukee); Robert E. Keeton, United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Massachusetts; Carolyn Dineen King, United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit; Hans A. Linde, Oregon Supreme Court; John
W. Martin, Jr., Vice President and General Counsel, Ford Motor Co. (Dearborn); Vin-
cent L McKusick, Retired Chief Justice, Supreme Judicial Court of Maine; Robert L
Rabin, Stanford Law School; Paul D. Rheingold, Paul D. Rheingold, P.C. (New York);
Gary T. Schwartz, University of California at Los Angeles School of Law; Victor E.
Schwartz, Crowell & Moring (Washington, D.C.); Marshall S. Shapo, Northwestern Uni-
versity School of Law;, Michael Traynor, Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund (San Francis-
co); Bill Wagner, Wagner, Cunningham, Baughan & McLaughlin (Tampa); and Paul C.
Weler, Harvard University Law School
10. For a current list of the Members Consultative Group, see RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABIUrY vii-xii (Proposed Final Draft, Preliminary Ver-
sion 1996).
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liaison groups. In drafting the Restatement, committees of the American
Bar Association (ABA)," the Association of Trial Lawyers of America
(ATLA),"2 the Defense Research and Trial Lawyers Association,"3 and
the Product Liability Advisory Council (PLAC) 4 met with the Report-
ers to discuss the various preliminary drafts.
The Reporters consider comments from these various groups and
then prepare a second draft, which they present to the AM Council
(Council Draft)." The ALI Council meets to discuss and finally vote on
the draft. The Council may suggest revisions to the Council Draft. Only
after receiving approval of the ALI Council do the Reporters undertake
the preparation of a tentative draft for presentation to the full ALI
membership at the annual May meeting for approval.
At the annual meeting, the members often present and vote on formal
amendments to the tentative draft. Additionally, members frequently
suggest language changes to the Reporters. Although the membership
votes on the tentative draft, final approval of a Restatement project is
contingent upon the approval of a proposed final draft at the annual
meeting by the membership. Currently, Jim Henderson and I are work-
ing on the Proposed Final Drqft of the Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Products Liability that we will present to the membership at the annu-
al meeting in May 1997.1
11. The ABA was established in 1878 and currently has over 375,000 members.
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ASSOCITIONS 631-32 (31st ed. 1996). The Association was created
for the purpose of promoting professional improvement, providing public services,
improving civil and criminal justice administration, and increasing the public availabili-
ty of legal services. Id,
12. Currently with 60,000 members, the ATLA was founded in 1946 for the purpose
of protecting victims' rights, including those concerning product safety. ld, at 738.
13. The Defense Research and Trial Lawyers Association is an organization consist-
ing of 19,000 members. Id. at 695.
14. The PLAC is a non-profit organization consisting of defense attorneys and man-
ufacturers who submit amicus briefs on product liability cases. Judith Resnik, Whose
Judgment? Vacating Judgments, Preference for Settlement, and the Role of Adjudica-
tion at the Close of the Twentieth Century, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1471, 1489 (1994).
15. The ALI Council, consisting of approximately 60 members from the bench, bar,
and academia, is the executive body of the ALL See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS: PRODUCTS LtuTr iii-iv (1995) (listing current ALI Council members).
16. Three tentative drafts were presented to the membership: (1) the first tentative
draft, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY (Tentative Draft No. 1,
1994) [hereinafter Tentative Draft No. 1]; (2) the second tentative draft, see RESTATE-
MENT (TrDm) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABnHrry (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1995) [hereinafter
Tentative Draft No. 2]; and (3) the third tentative draft, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY (Tentative Draft No. 3, 1996) [hereinafter Tentative Draft
I. RES IPSA LoQumTi AND REASONABLE ALTERNATIVE DESIGN
One of the topics that profited from the intense deliberative process
was the proper interplay between res ipsa loquitur and the prerequisite
of a reasonable alternative design to establish liability in a design defect
case.
It is undisputed that res ipsa loquitur applies to product liability cas-
es. 7 Tentative Droft No. 1 limited the application of the res ipsa doc-
trine to manufacturing defect cases. It provided:
§ 3. Inference of Manqfacturtng Defect Without Proof of Specific Defect When a
product falls to function as a reasonable person would expect it to function and
causes harm under circumstances where it is more probable than not that the
malfunction was caused by a manufacturing defect, the trier of fact may Infer that
such a defect caused the malfunction and plaintiff need not specify the nature of
the defect '
We argued that a plaintiff bringing a claim for an alleged design defect
should not be allowed to use res ipsa to establish a prima facie case. The
Restatement's test for design defect, based on a risk-utility analysis, re-
quires that a plaintiff show that a reasonable alternative design of the
defendant's product could have been adopted that would have avoided or
reduced the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the defendant's prod-
uct." If a plaintiff utilizes res ipsa in a design defect case to establish a
No. 31. The most recent draft is the preliminary version of the proposed final draft,
dated October 18, 1996. See RESTATEMENT (ThIRD) OF ToRT: PRODUCTS LIABIIm (Pro-
posed Final Draft, Preliminary Version, 1996) [hereinafter Proposed Final Draft]. This
Article will, for the most part, employ the use of the second tentative draft unless
the draft significantly differs from the proposed final draft, in which case a notation
will be made.
17. See, e.g., Dietz v. Waller, 685 P.2d 744, 747-48 (Ariz. 1984) ("[N]o specific de-
fect need be shown if the evidence, direct or circumstantial, permits the inference
that the accident was caused by a defect."); Harrell Motors, Inc. v. Flanery, 612
S.W.2d 727, 729 (Ark. 1981) ('[Plroof of the specific defect is not required when
common experience tells us that the accident would not have occurred in the ab-
sence of a defect."); Cassisi v. Maytag Co., 396 So. 2d 1140, 1153 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1981) ("It is immaterial that the plaintiffs failed to identify the specific cause of the
malfunction since it is inferred that the malfunction itself... is evidence of the
product's defective condition."); Murray V. Farmers Ins. Co., 796 P.2d 101, 104 (Idaho
1990) ("[I]f the plaintiff cannot prove that a specific defect caused the accident, it
will suffice if it can be shown that the product malfunctioned, and that there are no
other reasonably likely causes of the malfunction.").
18. Tentative Draft No. 1, supra note 16, § 3.
19. The Restatement (Thuid) test for design defects reads: "[A] product is defective
in design when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been
reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design by the seller
or other distributor... and the omission of the alternative design renders the prod-
uct not reasonably safe.'
Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 16, § 2(b).
[Vol. 24: 839, 1997] Inside the Restatement
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
defect, then a court would excuse the plaintiff from having to show a
reasonable alternative design: the court infers the defect from the very
occurrence of the incident that brought about the harm.
Second, the Restatement explicitly rejects the consumer expectations
test as a stand-alone test for a defect.2' If plaintiffs use res ipsa in a
design defect case, it could be argued that the consumer expectations
test would come in through the back door. A plaintiff would essentially
assert that the defendant's product was defective because the product
caused injury under circumstances that disappointed a reasonable
consumer's expectations. Thus, the use of res ipsa in a design defect
case would partially reinvigorate the application of the consumer expec-
tations test. Concerned with the possible internal inconsistencies that
might arise if the Restatement were to recognize res ipsa in design defect
cases, we originally took the position that it applied only to manufactur-
ing defect cases.
In Tentative Dqft No. 2, we relaxed the requirement of a reasonable
alternative design in cases where the product fails to perform its mani-
20. Under the consumer expectations test, a product is defective if it is "dangerous
to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer
who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its
characteristics." REsTATEmENT (SECOND) OF TORs: PRODUCTS LIABILrrY § 402A cmt i
(1965).
21. The Restatement (Third) explicitly rejects the consumer expectations test See
Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 16, § 2 cmts. c, f In addition to the reasons set
forth in the comments, rejection of the consumer expectations test was further sup-
ported by our finding that the courts that had actually applied this test rarely did so
without engaging in some risk-utility balancing. See, e.g., Aller v. Rodgers Mach. Mfg.
Co., 268 N.W.2d 830, 834-35 (Iowa 1978). "he article sold must be dangerous to an
extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer .... '
Proof of unreasonableness involves a balancing process. On one side of this is the
utility of the product and on the other is the risk of its use." Id. (quoting in part
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF Toirr § 402A cmt i); Baughn v. Honda Motor Co., 727
P.2d 655, 660 (Wash. 1986) (stating that the consumer expectations test actually com-
bines the consideration of consumer expectations with an analysis of the risk and
utility inherent in a product's use).
The consumer expectations test has been rejected at both the high side and at
the low side, meaning that the failure of a product to meet consumer expectations
does not, in itself, make out a case for design defect, nor does the fact that a
product meets consumer expectations serve as a defense to a design defect case.
Such an application would reaffirm the patent danger rule, which the Restatement
(Third) explicitly rejects. See Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 16, § 2 cmt. c ("Sub-
section (b) does not recognize the obviousness of a design-related risk as precluding
a finding of defectiveness."); see also id. § 2 cmt f.
festly intended function, thus triggering the conclusion that a defect of
some kind is the most probable explanation for the injury-causing event
Section 3 of Tentative Drft No. 2 provided:
§ 3. Circumstantial Evidence Supporting Inference of Product Defect
It may be inferred that the harm sustained by the plaintiff was caused by a
product defect, without proof of the specific nature of the defect, when:
(a) the incident resulting in the harm was of a kind that ordinarily would oc-
cur only as a result of product defect; and
(b) evidence in the particular case supports the conclusion that more probably
than not-
(1) the cause of the harm was a product defect rather than other possible
causes, including the conduct of the plaintiff and third persons; and
(2) the product defect existed at the time of sale or distribution. '
We base our continued support of this provision on the rationale that,
in some design flaw cases, the flaw is so fatal that the design causes the
product to malfunction in a manner identical to that of a manufacturing
defect For example, assume that the seat of a bicycle is designed in
such a way that, during ordinary use, the seat disconnects with the body
of the bicycle. When this occurs, the bicycle has malfunctioned in a way
that is similar to the manner in which a bicycle with a serious manufac-
turing defect would fail. In theory, a plaintiff alleging defective design
has the ability to demonstrate the fatal design shortcoming of the
defendant's bicycles. If the design is fatally flawed, that design flaw is
common to that bicycle model. However, because the incident is one
that would ordinarily occur only as a result of a product defect, as a
practical matter, the courts should allow a jury to infer a defect without
requiring the plaintiff to show the type of defect involved.
Critics have argued that a plaintiff should specify a design defect
whenever possible,' and that once we allow the plaintiff to infer a pos-
sible design defect based on res ipsa, courts will begin to countenance
design defect cases predicated on a consumer expectations test.' This
22. Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 16, § 3. The Proposed Final Draft differs
from the second tentative draft in that the final draft replaces "the cause of the harm
was a product defect rather than other possible causes, including the conduct of the
plaintiff and third persons," see id., with "the incident that harmed the plaintiff was
the result of a product defect rather than being solely the result of other possible
causes." See Proposed Final Draft, supra note 16, § 3.
23. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Hoffman, Res Ipsa Loquitur and Indeterminate Product
Defects: If They Speak For Themselves, What Are They Saying?, 36 S. TEDL L REV.
353, 378 (1995) ("Courts do and should prefer claims based on evidence of specific
defects whenever possible.").
24. Some courts, in applying the section 3 principle, talk in terms of the product
failing to meet consumer expectations. See, e.g., Doyle v. White Metal Rolling &
Stamping Corp., 618 N.E.2d 909, 916 (III. Ct. App. 1993).
[A] plaintiff may create an inference that a product was defective by direct
[Vol 24: 839, 19971 Imide the Restatement
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result, however, is unlikely to occur for several reasons. First, there is a
vast difference between utilizing the consumer expectations test as a
black-letter test for defect and using it in the context of res ipsa. The for-
mer is a clear-cut liability rule, the latter is an inference of defect that
the defendant can rebut. Admittedly, res ipsa has an expansive quality to
it. The line between its use as a liability rule and as a permissible infer-
ence is not razor sharp. However, that is to the good. Allowing some
room for play is a healthy phenomenon. Ultimately, res ipsa, unlike the
consumer expectations test, will not devour design defect litigation. Res
ipsa is an old doctrine that has been used by the courts for over one
hundred years.' It is a limited doctrine used sparingly by the courts,
and its occasional use in clear-cut product failure cases will save plain-
tiffs the expense of high-tech litigation in cases where the inference of
product defect is compelling.' It will not seriously compromise the rule
or circumstantial evidence that- (1) there was no abnormal use of the prod-
uct; (2) ... there was no reasonable secondary cause of the irjury, and
(3) ... the product failed to perform in the manner reasonably to be ex-
pected in light of Its nature and intended function.
Id.; Mote v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 466 N.E.2d 593, 596 (U. Ct. App. 1984) (argu-
ing it was reasonable for the jury to conclude that there was an absence of abnor-
mal use and that the ladder failed to perform in the manner reasonably to be expect-
ed in light of its intended function); Tulgetske v. RD. Werner Co., 408 N.E.2d 492,
495 (IlL Ct. App. 1980) (plaintiff can make out a strict liability claim by proving that
the product failed to perform in a manner reasonably to be expected in light of its
intended function); Cassisi v. Maytag Co., 396 So. 2d 1140, 1146 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1981) ('[E]vidence of the nature of an accident itself may, under certain circumstanc-
es, give rise to a reasonable inference that the product was defective because the
circumstances of the product's failure may be such as to frustrate the ordinay
consumer's expectations of its continued performance."); Cincinnati Ins. Co. v.
Volkswagen, Inc., 502 N.E.2d 651, 655 (Ohio CL App. 1985) (determining that in a fire
case, "the reasonable expectations of a buyer of a motor vehicle is that the main
electrical cable harness of such vehicle will not start fire").
25. See, e.g., Byrne v. Boadle, 159 Eng. Rep. 299, 300 (1863) (stating that 'there
are certain cases of which it may be said res ipsa loquitur .... In some cases the
Courts have held that the mere fact of the accident having occurred is evidence of
negligence.").
26. Yet another reason supports the use of res ipsa without requiring the plaintiff
to establish an inference of manufacturing defect. To require a plaintiff to establish
an inference that the product failed because of a manufacturing defect would place
the burden on the plaintiff to negate the possibility that a defective design was re-
sponsible for the product failure. Allowing a general inference of product defect
when the classic requisites of res ipsa are met frees a plaintiff from carrying this
onerous burden.
requiring proof of a reasonable alternative design in the classic design
defect case.
lV. MANIFESTLY UNREASONABLE DESIGN AND REASONABLE
ALTERNATIVE DESIGN
In Tentative Drft No. 1, the Restatement took the position that proof
of a reasonable alternative design could not be dispensed with by alleg-
ing that a product was so dangerous that it should not have been market-
ed at all. The language in section 2, Comment c was uncompromising. It
provided in part:
The requirement in § 2(b) that plaintiff show a reasonable alternative design ap-
plies even though the plaintiff alleges that the category of product sold by the
defendant is sufficiently dangerous that it should not have been marketed at all
Thus common and widely distributed products such as alcoholic beverages, tobac-
co, small firearms, and above-ground swimming pools may be found to be defec-
tive only upon proof of the requisite conditions in § 2(a), (b), or (c). If such prod-
ucts are defectively manufactured or sold without reasonable warnings as to their
danger when such warnings are appropriate, or if reasonable alternative designs
could have been adopted, then liability under §§ 1 and 2 may attach. Absent proof
of defect under those Sections, however, courts should not impose liability based
on a conclusion that an entire product category should not be distributed in the
first instance. Whether tort liability should be imposed for categories of products
that are generally available and widely used and consumed, but are considered
socially undesirable by some segments of society, should not be resolved by the
courts. That issue is better suited to resolution by legislatures and administrative
agencies, which can more appropriately consider whether distribution of such
product categories should be prohibited.-
Few within the AL argued that risk-utility balancing should be used to
declare such products as cigarettes, alcohol, or handguns defective be-
cause the overall harm of these products to society outweighs their bene-
fit. Considerable sympathy did exist, however, for allowing the possibility
that some products might have such low social utility and present such
great risk that a court might declare them defective without going
through the formal process of proving a reasonable alternative design. At
the suggestion of one of the advisors, we added a separate comment in
Tentative Drft No. 2. Section 2, Comment d provided:
d. Design defects: possibility of manifestly unreasonable design. Several courts
have suggested that the designs of some products are so manifestly unreasonable,
in that they have low social utility and high degree of danger, that liability should
attach even absent proof of a reasonable alternative design. In large part the prob-
lem is one of how the range of relevant alternative designs is described. For ex-
ample, a toy gun that shoots hard rubber pellets with sufficient velocity to cause
injury to children could be found to be defectively designed within the rule of
§ 2(b). Toy guns that do not produce injury would constitute reasonable alterna-
27. Tentative Draft No. 1, supra note 16, § 2 cmt c.
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tives to the dangerous toy. Thus, toy guns that project ping pong balls, soft gelatin
pellets, or water might be found to be reasonable alternative designs to a toy gun
that shoots hard pellets. However, if consideration is limited to toy guns that are
capable of causing injury, then no reasonable alternative will, by hypothesis, be
available. In that instance, the design feature that defines which alternatives are
relevant-the capacity to injure-is precisely the feature on which the user places
value and of which the plaintiff complains. If a court were to adopt this character-
ization of the product, it could conclude that liability should attach without proof
of a reasonable alternative design. The court would condemn the product design
as defective and not reasonably safe because the extremely high degree of danger
posed by its use or consumption so substantially outweighs its negligible utility
that no rational adult, fully aware of the relevant facts, would choose to use or
consume the product.1
The subsequent Reporters' Note makes clear that there is little judicial
support for this comment" Courts to date have been unwilling to im-
pose category liability. Dicta in several opinions, however, indicates that
some courts do not wish to have their hands tied and might consider
imposing liability without proof of a reasonable alternative design for
products such as needlessly dangerous toys.' Comment d opens the
door to such liability. Some commentators express concern that courts
will read Comment d expansively and will utilize it to bypass the reason-
able alternative requirement that is the governing rule for establishing a
classic design defect."1 We believe that the well-established attitude of
courts on the issue of category liability does not warrant such fears.n
Comment d recognizes that in a very narrow band of cases courts may
28. Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 16, § 2 cmt d. Robert L Habush, an advisor
to the Restatement, suggested Comment d. See supra note 9.
29. See Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 16, Reporters' Note to cmt. d.
30. See, e.g., Armentrout v. FMC Corp., 842 P.2d 175, 185 n.11 (Colo. 1992) (en
banc) (citing Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 577 P.2d 1322, 1328 n.5 (Or. 1978));
Kallio v. Ford Motor Co., 407 N.W.2d 92, 97 n.8 (Minn. 1987) ("Conceivably, rare
cases may exist where the product may be judged unreasonably dangerous because it
should be removed from the market rather than .be redesigned"); Wilson, 577 P.2d
1322, 1328 n.5 (Or. 1978) (en banc) ("There might be cases in which the jury would
be permitted to hold the defendant liable on account of a dangerous design feature
even though no safer design was feasible (or there was no evidence of a safer prac-
ticable alternative).").
31. See Harvey M. Grossman, Categorical Liability: Why the Gates Should Be Kept
Closed, 36 S. TEx L REV. 385 (1995) (explaining why categorical liability should not
be embraced as part of the product liability system).
32. For an extensive discussion as to why courts have rejected category liability,
see James A. Henderson Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Closing the American Product Lia-
bility Fmntier The Rejection of Liability Without Defect, 66 N.Y.U. L REv. 1263
(1991).
wish to bypass the formal requirements of section 2(b), and that when
the stringent conditions set forth in Comment d are met, then the imposi-
tion of liability would not be inconsistent with the spirit of the Restate-
ment.
V. CRASHWORTHINESS: RESOLVING TWO DIFFICULT ISSUES
The Restatement recognizes a cause of action for increased harm due
to product defect. Tentative Drtft No. 2, section 11(a) sets forth the ba-
sic rule:
When a product is defective within the meaning of § 2 and the defect is a substan-
tial factor in increasing the harm suffered by the plaintiff beyond the harm that
would have resulted from nondefect-related causes, the product seller is subject
to liability for the increased harm.1
Although there was no dissent within the AL as to the basic rule,' two
issues surrounding the application of the increased harm doctrine arose
in the deliberations. The first issue concerns the problem that arises
when a plaintiffs expert can opine only that the plaintiffs injuries would
have been reduced had the product been defect-free, but is not able to
testify as to the extent that the damages would have been reduced. The
Restatement adopts the strong majority position known as the Fox-
MitcheU rule.' This approach requires the plaintiff to prove that the
product defect was a substantial factor in increasing the harm suffered
by the plaintiff beyond the harm that would have resulted from other
causes. Once the plaintiff meets that burden, then if there is no proof
supporting what damages would have resulted in the absence of the
33. Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 16, § 11(a).
34. In the early years of tort liability for defective product design, some courts
refused to recognize a duty on the part of an auto manufacturer to design a reason-
ably crashworthy vehicle. See, e.g., Evans v. General Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822, 824-
25 (7th Cir. 1966), overruled by Huff v. White Motor Corp., 565 F.2d 104 (7th Cir.
1977). The overwhelming majority, however, followed the view of Larsen v. General
Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 501-03 (8th Cir. 1968), which held that collisions are
foreseeable and that manufacturers must design cars so that they are reasonably
crashworthy. The Larsen rule now is the majority position of American courts. In
Blankenship v. General Motors Corp., 406 S.E.2d 781, 784 (W. Va. Ct. App. 1991), the
court reviewed the authority and found no support for Evans, which Huff overruled.
For an exhaustive listing of the cases following Larsen, see Barry Levenstam & Daryl
J. Lapp, Plaintiffs Burden of Proving Enhanced Injury in Crashworthiness Cases: A
Clash Worthy of Analysis, 38 DEPAUL L REv. 55, 61 n.33 (1989).
35. The rule receives its name from the two leading cases which adopted the doc-
trine at an early stage of the law's development Fox v. Ford Motor Co., 575 F.2d
774 (10th Cir. 1978) (applying Wyoming law); Mitchell v. Volkswagenwerk, AG, 669
F.2d 1199 (8th Cir. 1982) (applying Minnesota law). In a lengthy Reporters' Note, we
demonstrate that a strong majority of courts follow Fox-Mitchell. See Tentative Draft
No. 2, supra note 16, Reporters' Note to cmt. d.
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product defect, the product seller is liable for all of the plaintiffs harm
attributable to the defect and other causes.
The defendants argue that, because the plaintiffs must establish a rea-
sonable alternative design or a defect-free product through an expert in
order to demonstrate that the defect was a substantial factor in increas-
ing the plaintiffs harm, such an expert must perforce have an opinion as
to what injuries could have been avoided had the product been defect-
free.' The short answer to this argument is that cases continue to arise
where litigants are not able to overcome the hurdle of establishing the
extent of increased damages with sufficient particularity.
The defense bar's contention that the Fox-Mitchell rule does nothing
but encourage slothful and sloppy trial preparation by plaintiffs' experts
does not carry the day. Plaintiffs have a strong incentive to demonstrate
to juries that a plaintiffs injuries were the direct result of the defendant's
defective product Experienced plaintiffs' counsel do not seek to rely on
a trial strategy in which the plaintiff is only able to establish some in-
creased harm and require the jury to fill in the rest based on a rule of
law which says that when the plaintiffs prove some increased harm the
jury must charge the defendant with all of the results of the accident
Such an approach, although theoretically correct, has little jury appeal.
The plaintiffs enhance their chances to maximize their damages when
they are able to adduce direct evidence on the tie-in between defect and
injury. When plaintiffs rely on the Fox-Mitchell rule, they do so generally
because more specific testimony is not available.
Defendants further argue that the Fox-Mitchell rule places them in an
unenviable position. Defendants usually defend crashworthiness cases by
denying the claim that the product was defective. In order to minimize
damages when a plaintiffs expert asserts some increased harm, the Fox-
Mitchell rule would require them to hypothesize that the product was
indeed defective and then argue that, in any event, the defect did not
cause all of the injuries that the plaintiff suffered. In short, the defendant
would have to come forward with evidence minimizing the increased-
harm injuries. Defendants contend that as a practical matter, they cannot
try these cases in the alternative. Once defendants concede the possibili-
ty of defect, they seriously compromise their first-line defense.
36. See, e.g., Heather Fox Vickles & Michael E. Oldman, Enhanced Injury Should
Not Equal Enhanced Liability, 36 S. TEx. L REV. 417, 435-36 (1995) (discussing the
expert witness' role in enhanced injury claims).
With full recognition that defense arguments on this matter have sub-
stance, we support the Fox-Mitchell rule. After all the arguments, we are
left with a severely irnured plaintiff whose expert points to product de-
fect as a cause of increased injury. We should not encourage exaggerated
and fabricated expert testimony to fill the requirements of an unyielding
rule that requires the plaintiff to establish the extent of the increased
harm. The plaintiff must establish that there has been some increased
harm due to product defect. If that is all that the plaintiff is able to es-
tablish, then as between a plaintiff who has been harmed by the
defendant's product defect but cannot quantify its exact parameters, and
the defendant who caused some increased harm, the equities lie with the
injured plaintiff.
The second difficult issue we confronted was the role of plaintiff fault
in an increased harm case. In general, the Restatement had taken the
position that plaintiff fault may reduce recovery in product liability cas-
es.' This position is the strong majority view. A small number of courts
are not willing to apply comparative fault in product liability cases.'
Some courts take the position that when plaintiff fault results from the
failure of a plaintiff to discover a product defect, comparative fault
should not apply.' At the other extreme, some courts treat assumption
of the risk as a total bar to recovery.' We eschewed recognizing sepa-
rate categories of plaintiff fault and recommended that all forms of
plaintiff conduct be considered under the comparative fault doctrine.
The issue of comparative fault in the crashworthiness setting present-
ed the Reporters with a predicament. Tentative Draft No. 1, section 6,
Comment f set forth the dilemma
f Paintiffs fault in cases of increased harm. Section 7 sets forth the rules gen-
erally governing plaintiff fault in products liability litigation. It provides that all
forms of plaintiff fault are to be considered by the trier of fact for the purposes of
apportioning liability between the plaintiff and the product seller. The relative
seriousness of plaintiffs fault should be taken into account by the trier of fact in
allocating the appropriate percentages between the plaintiff and the product sell-
er, but should not serve automatically either to absolve the plaintiff or to bar the
plaintiff from recovery.
Cases of increased harm require a different rule. The requirement that an auto-
mobile be reasonably crashworthy, for example, aims to protect the plaintiff from
increased harm arising from harm-causing uses of the product that defendant
should have foreseen and protected against. An automobile, not otherwise defec-
37. See Tentative Draft No. 1, supra note 16, § 7 cmt d.
38. See, e.g., Lippard v. Houdaille Indus., Inc., 715 S.W.2d 491, 497 (Mo. 1986);
Bowling v. Heil Co., 511 N.E.2d 373, 380 (Ohio 1987).
39. See, e.g., Murray v. Fairbanks Morse, 610 F.2d 149, 161-62 n.14 (3d Cir. 1979)
(applying Virgin Islands law); Star Furniture Co. v. Pulaski Furniture Co., 297 S.E.2d
854, 863 (W. Va. 1982).
40. See, e.g., Fiske v. MacGregor Div., 464 A.2d 719, 728-29 (ILL 1983).
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tive, does not become defective because it fals to protect a plaintiff against harm-
causing conduct where the risks exceed those that defendant could reasonably
have protected against However, if the risks created by plaintiff's conduct are
within the range that justifies crashworthiness protection, plaintiffs conduct cre-
ates the very situation in which the plaintiff has a legitimate right to expect the
automobile to provide reasonable protection. This is so regardless of the nature of
the plaintiff's conduct. Accordingly, plaintiffs fault should not be taken into ac-
count in determining the defendant's liability for the defect-caused increase in
harm.
41
Comment f generated significant controversy. Those opposed to its
adoption argued it would entitle a drunken driver, a speeding driver, or
one who was driving under the influence of narcotics to undiminished re-
covery in a crashworthiness case. Furthermore, the heavy weight of au-
thority was contrary to Comment f. The membership introduced and
approved a formal motion to reverse Comment f and hold all plaintiffs
subject to the general rule of comparative fault. Tentative Drrft No. 2,
section 11, Comment f now reflects the will of the membership on this
issue. It provides:
f. Plaintiffs fault in cases of increased harm. Section 12 sets forth the general
rules governing plaintiffs fault in products liability litigation. It provides that all
forms of plaintiffs fault are relevant in apportioning liability between the plaintiff
and the product seller. The seriousness of plaintiffs fault and the nature of the
product defect are relevant in allocating the appropriate percentages between the
plaintiff and the product seller, but should not serve automatically to absolve the
plaintiff from fault or to bar the plaintiff from recovery. See § 12, Comment d.
Accordingly, the contributory fault of the plaintiff in causing the accident that re-
41. Tentative Draft No. 1, supra note 16, § 6 cmt. L.
42. See Cleveland v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 890 F.2d 1540, 1550-51 (10th Cir. 1989)
("[A]s to that portion of damages for which the original tortfeasors and the
crashworthiness tortfeasors are concurrent torfeasors... the negligence of all of
the tortfeasors, and of the Plaintiff, must be compared"); Whitehead v. Toyota Motor
Corp., 897 S.W.2d 684, 693-94 (Tenn. 1995) C([T]he fault of the defendant and of the
plaintiff should be compared with each other with respect to all damages and injuries
for which the conduct of each party is a cause in fact and a proximate cause."); see
also VicTOR E. ScHwAlrr, ComARpAunv NEGUGENCE § 11-5(a) (3d ed. 1994).
43. The following motion was adopted at the annual meeting of the ALI, May 17-
20, 1994. The 1994 Addendum to Tentative Drft No. 1 stated-
[A]ll forms of plaintiff fault are to be considered by a jury for the purposes
of apportioning -responsibility between the plaintiff and the product seller.
The relative seriousness of plaintiffs fault should be taken into account by
the trier of fact in allocating the appropriate percentages between the plain-
tiff and the product seller but should not serve automatically to absolve the
plaintiff from fault or bar the plaintiff from recovery.
Tentative Draft' No. I (Addendum), supra note 16, § 6 cmt. f.
suited in defect-related increased harm is relevant in apportioning damages be-
tween or among the parties, according to applicable apportionment law. In appor-
tioning damages in these cases, it may be important that requiring a product to be
designed reasonably to prevent increased harm aims to protect the plaintiff from
harm when the plaintiff is in a position where self-protection is no longer possi-
ble."
There is no easy way out of this quandary. We are satisfied that the
Institute has come out the right way on this closely balanced question.
Courts will be free to instruct juries that they may take into account the
nature of the defect and that, in crashworthiness cases, the product
should have protected occupants in the event of an accident whether the
plaintiff or other parties caused the accident Juries will have to weigh
and balance the equities in assessing the percentage of responsibility that
they assign to the various parties.
VI. PRESCRIPTON DRUGS: LIABILrFY FOR FAILURE TO WARN AND
DEFECTIVE DESIGN
No discussion of the section dealing with prescription drugs can begin
without some reference to section 402A, Comment k' Cognoscenti
know this comment dealing with unavoidably unsafe products to be enig-
matic and unpenetrable. The treatment of prescription drugs in Comment
k leaves the reader bewildered as to whether the rules for failure to
warn or design defect differ from those that govern products in general.
It appears that Dean Prosser, the Reporter for the Restatement (Second)
who drafted this section, meant to carve out some separate status for
prescription drugs, but what he intended remains a mystery. In the inter-
im, the courts have decided hundreds of cases making reference to the
famous Comment k. For all practical purposes, they might as well have
been citing the Oracle at Delphi.
Section 8 of Tentative Drqft No. 2 seeks to clarify the ambiguities that
have haunted this area of the law for almost three decades.46 First, as to
the action for failure to warn, the Restatement provides that a manufac-
turer is subject to liability for failing to provide "reasonable instructions
or warnings regarding foreseeable risks of harm."4 Liability does not
devolve on a drug manufacturer for failing to warn about risks that were
not foreseeable at the time of sale. Liability for failure to warn does not
44. Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 16, § 11 cmt f.
45. For a discussion of Comment k, see James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D.
Twerskd, A Proposed Revision of Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
77 CoRsELL L Rnv. 1512, 1536-45 (1992), and James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D.
Twersid, Will A New Restatement Help Settle 7rubled Waters: Reflections, 42 AM. U.
L REv. 1257, 1264-65 (1993).
46. See Tentative Draft No. 2, supm note 16, § 8.
47. Id.
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differ markedly from that which governs product manufacturers in gener-
aL The Restatement imposes a foreseeability requirement in section 2
for all failure to warn claims.4 Case law supports this proposition with
regard to products in generand, and many courts explicitly require fore-
seeability as a necessary predicate in any drug case."
48. See id. § 2(c).
49. Id.
50. See id, Reporters' Notes to § 2 cmt. .
51. See, e.g., DeLuwyea v. Winthrop Lab., 697 F.2d 222, 228-29 (8th Cir. 1983) (ap-
plying Arkansas law); Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d 417, 426 (2d Cir. 1969)
(applying Connecticut law); Gaston v. Hunter, 588 P.2d 326, 340 (Ariz. CL App. 1978);
Woodill v. Parke Davis & Co., 374 N.E.2d 683, 686-87 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978), ffd, 402
N.E.2d 194 (1L 1980); Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Chapman, 388 N.E.2d 541, 548 (Ind. CL
App. 1979); Moore v. Vanderloo, 386 N.W.2d 108, 116 (Iowa 1986); Martin v. Hacker,
628 N.E.2d 1308, 1311 (N.Y. 1993) ('the manufacturer's duty is to warn of all poten-
tial dangers in its prescription drugs that it knew, or, in the exercise of reasonable
care, should have known to exist.").
In Carlin v. Superior Court (Upjohn Co.), the court struggled with the question
of whether strict liability should apply in a drug failure to warn case. Carimi v. Supe-
rior Court (Upjohn Co.), 920 P.2d 1347, 1348-54 (Cal. 1996). Apparently all of the
opinions agree that some negligence-type concepts are internalized in the law of strict
liability. Id, at 1354, 1358. For example, all agree that liability will attach only for
risks that were reasonably scientifically knowable. The Restatement agrees with this
view. See Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 16, § 8(d)(2) crnt. g. The conflict be-
tween the majority and the dissent deals not so much with the issue of reasonable
foreseeability but rather with what standards are to govern whether a risk is of suffi-
cient magnitude to disclose. Neither the majority nor the dissenting opinions cited the
relevant section of the comments. Section 8, Comment d speaks to the problem in
general It provides:
d. Liability for failure adequately to instruct or warn prescribing and other
health care providers. Failure to instruct or warn is the major basis of liabili-
ty for manufacturers of prescription drugs and medical devices. When pre-
scribing health care providers are adequately informed of the relevant ben-
efits and risks associated with various prescription drugs and medical devic-
es, they can reach appropriate decisions regarding which drug or device is
best for specific patients. Sometimes warnings serve to inform health care
providers of unavoidable risks that inhere in the drug or medical device. By
definition, such a warning would not aid the health care provider in reducing
the risk of injury to the patient by taking precautions in how the drug is
administered or the medical device is used. However, warnings of unavoid-
able risks allow the health care provider, and thereby the patient, to make
an informed choice whether to utilize the drug or medical device ...
Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 16, § 8 cmt. d.
To the extent that the controversy concerns the magnitude of the risk that
should trigger a duty to warn, I find little in the Restatement draft that addresses the
question. Courts are, of .course, free to interpret the Restatement as they see fit This
It is in the area of drug design that the Restatement (Third) provides
the clarity that has been so sorely lacking to date. Relying on Comment
k, many courts have refused to recognize a cause of action based on
defective drug design.' However, a significant number of courts have
indicated a willingness to entertain a cause of action for defective drug
design.' Yet, there has been considerable confusion as to what it takes
to make out a case of defective design. On reflection, it became clear
that if a given drug is the drug of choice for some class of patients, then
courts should not find the drug designed defectively. Courts should not
declare FDA approved drugs defective when a reasonable medical pro-
vider would prescribe the drug for any class of patients. Clearly, some
drugs are inappropriate for some patients. It is the role of proper warn-
ings to alert the medical profession about the dangers inherent in the use
Reporter can only point out that, in his view, the statements by the various opinions
in Carlin, as to the position of the Restatement on the issue in conflict, are inappo-
site.
52. See Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 482-83 (CaL 1988); Grundber v.
Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89, 92-95 (Utah 1991).
53. See, e.g., Brochu v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 642 F.2d 652, 654-55 (1st Cir. 1981)
(applying New Hampshire law and finding design defect cause of action proper when
an available alternative design would have provided the same benefits with far less
risk); Rohrbough v. Wyeth Lab., 719 F. Supp. 470, 476-77 (N.D. W. Va. 1989) (stating
that design of vaccine is subject to ordinary risk-utility analysis), offd, 916 F.2d 970
(4th Cir. 1990); Kociemba v. G.D. Searle & Co., 695 F. Supp. 432, 433-35 (D. Minn.
1988) (finding single balancing test for reasonableness in determining liability for
design defect); Shanks v. Upjohn Co., 835 P.2d 1189, 1193-98 (Alaska 1992) (discuss-
ing public policies supporting strict liability for defectively designed products which
outweigh the policies protecting pharmaceutical companies); West v. Searle & Co.,
806 S.W.2d 608, 611-13 (Ark. 1991) (holding manufacturer may defend against design
defect case by demonstrating through risk-utility analysis that product was unavoid-
ably unsafe); Adams v. G.D. Searle & Co., 576 So. 2d 728, 732-33 (Fla Dist Ct. App.
1991) (stating that protection from design defect liability extends only to products
that pass risk-utility balancing test for reasonable design, not to all drugs and medical
devices per se); Toner v. Lederle Lab., 732 P.2d 297, 308-09 (Idaho 1987) (stating in
dictum that protection from design claims will be given only on a case-by-case basis,
that applicability of unavoidably unsafe exemption depends on whether the product's
benefits outweigh the risks, and noting that Comment k by its terms does not give
blanket immunity to all drugs); Savina v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 795 P.2d 915, 924-26
(Kan. 1990) (holding that in failure to warn cases courts determine application of
Comment k on a case-by-case basis); Allison v. Merck & Co., 878 P.2d 948, 954 (Nev.
1994) (stating that strict liability is appropriate even when overall benefits of drug
outweigh risks); Feldman v. Lederle Lab., 479 A.2d 374, 382-83 (N.J. 1984) (stating in
dictum that "[dirugs, like any other products, may contain defects that could have
been avoided by better manufacturing or design); Davila v. Bodeson, 704 P.2d 1119,
1127-28 (N.M. Ct. App. 1985) (finding that unavoidably unsafe exemption from strict
liability is appropriate when useful drug poses certain dangers even when properly
prepared and labelled); White v. Wyeth Lab., 533 N.E.2d 748, 752 (Ohio 1988) (argu-
ing that prescription drugs do not per se fall within Comment k, but will be consid-
ered on a case-by-case basis).
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of such drugs. The fear that some physicians will pay inadequate atten-
tion to a warning and misprescribe a drug does not serve as an adequate
predicate to declare a drug defectively designed on the ground that al-
lowing the drug on the market will result in significant risk to the gener-
al user population. Patients should not be forced to use alternative drugs
of lesser efficacy merely because some physicians will be guilty of mal-
practice by failing to heed adequate warnings.
If the test for defective drug design is whether a reasonable health
care provider, knowing the foreseeable risks and therapeutic benefits of
the drug, would prescribe it for any class of patients, then one may legiti-
mately ask whether the design cause of action adds anything to the tradi-
tional cause of action for failure to warn. A drug that has no legitimate
use for any class of patients is most likely to be one that fails to ade-
quately warn health care providers of the risks attendant to its use. Pre-
sumably, if the drug manufacturer truly warned about the attendant
risks, the physicians would not prescribe the drug when other drugs of
lesser risk would serve the same purpose.
One need not quarrel with the observation that defectively designed
drugs under the Restatement definition will most likely be drugs with
inadequate warnings, yet still insist that the drug design cause of action
has a role to play. Plaintiffs routinely bring actions based on both defec-
tive design and inadequate warning. When a cause of action is legitimate
and has independent veracity, there is no reason to deprive the plaintiff
of the claim. Furthermore, in a world in which the common law doctrine
of joint and several liability has been seriously compromised by both
legislative and judicial reform, fault allocation and ultimate recovery may
vary greatly depending on whether the cause of action against the drug
manufacturer is based on failure to warn, defective design, or both. As
between a physician who has committed malpractice in prescribing a
drug and a drug manufacturer who has been found liable for manufactur-
ing a defective drug, the fault allocation may be weighted more heavily
against a drug manufacturer if, in addition to inadequate warning, a drug
is found to be defectively designed.
Finally, as my co-Reporter, Jim Henderson, has demonstrated in a
recent article,' the case law supporting the Restatement position is
more imposing than we first thought. Courts that have straggled with the
54. James A. Henderson, Jr., Prescription Drug Design Liability Under the Pro-
posed Restatement (Third) of Torts: A Reporter's Perspective, 48 RuTGERs L REv. 471
(1996).
problem of drug design have come to recognize the good common sense
of the position that a drug should be declared defective in design only if
doctors should not prescribe the drug for any class of patients. Once the
drug has a legitimate niche, the manufacturer should be held liable only
for failure to warn.
VII. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
AND THE UCC
The Restatement (Third) and the UCC differ in their respective defini-
tions of defect. The Restatement employs a risk-utility test;' under Arti-
cle 2 of the UCC, the consumer expectations test governs.w Given this
difference, the question arises as to whether the UCC definition of defect
in an action for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability will
govern where a plaintiff sues for personal injury or property damage.
In Denny v. Ford Motor Co., 7 the New York Court of Appeals af-
firmed risk-utility balancing for actions based in tor. However, it held
that the consumer expectations test would apply in actions brought un-
der the UCC, reasoning that
as long as that legislative source of authority exists, we are not free to merge the
warranty cause of action with its tort-based sibling regardless of whether, as a
matter of policy, the contract-based warranty claim may fairly be regarded as a
historical relic that no longer has any independent substantive value.w
The Restatement takes the position that, when a plaintiff brings suit
for personal injury or property damage, the tort definition of defect
should govern liability.' The Restatement rejected the consumer expec-
tations test as an independent test for defect.' To allow a plaintiff to
bring an action based on consumer expectations by merely changing the
label on the case is inconsistent with the goal of uniformity which under-
lies the Restatement (Third) and all AM projects. It appears unseemly
for the ALl to proclaim in its Restatement project that claims for person-
55. See Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 16, § 2 cmt. c.
56. U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(c) (1989). Courts have interpreted section 2-314(2)(c), which
states that "[gloods to be merchantable must be . .. fit for the ordinary purposes for
which such goods are used," to be synonymous with a consumer expectations test.
See Barker v. Lull Engg Co., 573 P.2d 443, 454 (Cal. 1978); Denny v. Ford Motor Co.,
662 N.E.2d 730, 736 n.4 (N.Y. 1995).
57. Denny, 662 N.E.2d at 736-39.
58. Id at 736 (emphasis added).
59. Proposed Final Draft, supra note 16, § 2 cmt. n provides: "This Restatement
contemplates that a well-coordinated body of law dealing with liability for harm to
persons or property arising out of the sale of defective products would adopt the tort
definition of defect whether the action is characterized as one sounding in tort or
implied warranty of merchantability." Id.
60. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
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al injury or property damage should not be grounded by a consumer
expectations test and then, in its UCC project, to proclaim that the con-
sumer expectations test governs the selfsame action for personal injury
and property damage. However, the problem is even more profound. If a
state were to disagree with the Restatement and seek to impose a differ-
ent test for defect under its products liability law, that test should govern
personal injury and property damage cases. The UCC should not control
the courts by defining defect for tort law purposes.
The Denny case demonstrates the mischief that occurs when the legis-
lature forces the UCC definition on a court. After thirty years of products
liability litigation, the legislature should not force a court to adopt a
definition of defect that it characterizes as an "historical relic."" Article
2 of the UCC is currently under revision. It should make clear that its
definition of defect for commercial law purposes does not necessarily
govern in cases of personal injury and property damage. Courts should
be free to develop the appropriate definition of defect under products
liability law and should not have their hands tied by the drafters of the
Code. Of course, as a Reporter for the Restatement, I would hope that
courts would adopt the Restatement definition. In any event, the tail
should not wag the dog. The Code cannot and does not undertake to
work out the nuances of the law of defect. Courts charged with the re-
sponsibility of doing so should be free to use tort principles to decide
tort cases.
VIII. CONCLUSION
I have attempted to provide a glimpse into the process of writing the
Restatement. My co-Reporter, Jim Henderson, and I have sought to keep
an open door to all who endeavored to comment upon and improve the
quality of the drafts both substantively and aesthetically. When argu-
ments persuaded us, we recommended changes from our original drafts.
When we believed that our original position was principled and correct,
we remained steadfast. Throughout, as a result of informed and lively
critique, the drafts became more sophisticated and nuanced. The forum
provided by the ALI for reasoned deliberation served this project well. It
called on the Reporters to be both teachers and students of the law. It
was for this writer the quintessential academic experience.
61. See Denny, 622 N.E.2d at 736.

